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Our prevailing understanding of law is built largely on positivist premises and 
is focused mostly on the coercive processes of the State.  Positivism attempts 
to separate the coercive processes of the State from other forms of coercion 
like religious injunctions and social pressure.1 Looking at the issue from a 
historical and sociological perspective, R.M. Unger identifies a point at which 
“the division between state and society has been established.”2  It is at this 
point that positive law emerges.  Positive law “is a law deliberately imposed 
by government rather than spontaneously produced by society.”3 
Thus, positivist legal theorists have taken a largely top-down approach to 
law and have generated the belief that the law is something to be directed by 
professionals acting on the authority of the sovereign and functioning 
somewhat apart from ordinary citizens who are the subjects of the law.  The 
police are part of this group of professionals and enforce laws on the State’s 
authority and against citizens. The actions of the police are to be 
distinguished from mere social pressure, which is part of the administration of 
morals and more of a bottom-up enforcement technique in the sense that 
everyone is involved in enforcement. 
Positivism is a belief that is held so closely that it has become difficult to 
imagine any alternative.4  There are alternatives, however.  Simply because a 
State has a government with posited laws, that does not mean that it has a 
positivist system.  In many senses, the laws of earlier times were merely the 
written expression of a people’s sense of right and wrong.  The writing itself 
                                           
* Adjunct Professor, University of Alabama School of Law; Associate Dean, Faculty of 
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1 See e.g. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 6-8 (1961).  This central idea has become 
known as the “separation thesis” and requires a strict separation of law and morality.  
See e.g. JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW (1979). 
2 R.M. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY (1976). 
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positivism something new to say.  See Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Contemporary 
Relevance of Legal Positivism, 32 AUSTRALIAN J. OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 1, 2 (2007). 
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did not make a right or a wrong.  Rather, the written law gave a more 
permanent expression to the commitments of the community.  The very idea 
of the common law is that law can be reasoned out and discovered by judges 
after the incident in question in a case has occurred.  For positivists, the law 
should be published first and then applied.  This is how most people now 
think of the law – it comes from legislators and is applied to the populace.   
The primary role, then, has been given to the legislator who appears to 
mold the behaviors of citizens and who is voted into office often on 
ideological grounds in the hope that he or she will mold the behaviors of 
citizens in the right way.  It is surprising then that positivists for the most part 
avoid discussing the legislator’s role and avoid evaluating the contents of his 
or her laws. This exact issue came up when, after the collapse of Nazi 
Germany, some scholars concluded that positivist theory had the effect of 
making Germans living under the Nazi regime more obedient to “law as 
law.”5  Positivists like Hart countered that positivism actually encourages 
greater scrutiny of laws – and less obedience – because it separates law and 
morality and allows a person to look back on the law and evaluate it from a 
moral (and personal) perspective.6  Whether or not this is true in theory, it is 
certainly not the case that positivists have spent much time in their 
scholarship discussing the morality of various types of laws.  Hart himself 
claimed to be doing “descriptive jurisprudence” rather than “interpretative 
jurisprudence” and subtly disparaged the moral “evaluative” discourse of 
theorists like Ronald Dworkin.7 
In fact, as with Auguste Compte’s less popular type of “positivism,” 
legal positivists are concerned with science, not morality.  The first positivist 
Jeremy Bentham attempted not so much to separate law and morality as to 
replace traditional morality with a new idea, with a utilitarianism based on 
scientific principles. Bentham narrowed people’s life choices down to one: 
“Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, 
pain and pleasure.  It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as 
                                           
5 This point was made in a 1946 article by Gustav Radbruch, a German scholar who 
experienced first-hand the horrors of the Nazi regime and in reaction disavowed his 
positivist beliefs.  See Gustav Radbruch, Gesetzliches Unrecht und übergesetzliches 
Recht, in GUSTAV RADBRUCH, GESAMTAUSGABE (A. Kaufmann ed., 1990). 
6 See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 
593 (1958). 
7 Hart clearly disavows what he calls an “evaluative” enterprise:  “My account is 
descriptive…:  it does not seek to justify or commend on moral or other grounds the 
forms and structures which appear in my general account of law…”  HART 
(“Postscript”), supra note 1, at 240. 
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well as to determine what we shall do.”8  Seemingly, Bentham is offering 
advice – that people should be guided by the principle of utility – and at the 
same time relating a command of Nature that utility will determine their 
behavior anyway, whether they accept his advice or not.9  This illogical 
proposition is not significant as a representation of positivist thought – indeed 
positivists later moved away from utilitarian views such as this – but it well 
demonstratives the general and pervasive desire of positivists to supersede 
normal moral considerations with Newtonian-type forces.  When it later 
became apparent that this desire could not be fulfilled, most positivists simply 
dropped the simplistic assumptions of Bentham’s utilitarianism and gave up 
evaluating the contents of laws. It is noteworthy in this regard that, although 
Bentham and the Utilitarians were law reformers, later positivists have 
contributed very few suggestions for legal reform. 
Positivists instead have focused on the procedures necessary to pass 
valid law.  It is easier to describe procedure in objective scientific terms.  
Positivists say that they do not care what the lawgiver does and what type of 
law he or she creates so long as it can be classified positively as “law” or “not 
law.”  This avoids any non-scientific discussion of what the lawgiver should 
and should not do.  So although Hart lays out “rules of change” that tell the 
lawgiver how he or she can pass laws, there is no rule of policymaking that 
tells the lawgiver what laws are best. Again, positivists like Hart do not 
engage in moral “evaluative” discourse.10   
Mostly, positivists do not offer moral guidance to lawmakers and 
furthermore do not discuss in detail the forces governing the lawmaker’s 
decisions.  Thus, turbid conclusions like those of Bentham are avoided.  
There are two interesting exceptions in this regard, however.  First, Ronald 
Dworkin attempts to draw attention to the “principles” of a judge that come 
from the judge’s conscience and that influence judge-made law.11   Dworkin’s 
overall position really only makes sense when situated within a positivist 
conversation, and, unfortunately, Dworkin is thrown off course while 
attempting to engage positivists on their own terms.  In the end Dworkin’s 
“principles” sound like a natural force akin to gravity rather than a moral 
                                           
8 JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION (Burns and Hart, eds., 1970). 
9 As will be seen, this is not a matter of mere historical interest.  Many modern 
economists take Bentham at his word and adopt his assumptions about human behavior.  
See e.g. GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1976).   
10 HART (“Postscript”), supra note 1, at 240. 
11 See Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14 (1967). 
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choice.12   Second, law and economics theorists have taken the lawmaker’s 
role seriously and have attempted a more sophisticated elaboration of 
Bentham’s ideas. The decisions of a lawmaker bring him a certain positive 
utility.  Richard Posner explains that, for judges, a decision in a case is like a 
vote, and voting is a consumption activity that people enjoy.13  According to 
Public Choice theory, legislators also work for their self-interests.14  The 
problem with such descriptions is that they oversimplify lawmakers’ motives 
and do not account very well for why we might prefer one type of legislation 
– or one type of legislative process – rather than another. 
Positivism, then, appears to be a program to avoid moral discussions 
about the law.   This in fact strengthens the positivist position that there is a 
separation between law and morality and that the law is simply what is 
written in our statutes.  It is not appropriate, however, to engage positivists in 
a discussion about whether their propositions are true.  In fact, positivist 
“descriptions” are also “prescriptions” for a certain way of doing things. To 
the extent that positivism has become the predominant theory – implicitly 
accepted by legal professionals – it has made its own propositions true.  In 
other words, positivism has become a very popular belief.  A more relevant 
question would be, is positivism useful, or would some other belief be more 
useful?   
Likely positivists would say that they do not have a belief system at all 
but rather merely share a critical perspective.  Positivists, although originally 
utilitarian in policy, claim that they can be pluralistic in their policy positions.  
They say that it is legal moralists who have a belief system and are intolerant 
of other ideas.15  In fact, a belief in the value of self-criticism is still a belief, 
                                           
12 Thus Dworkin is overly concerned with judges instead of legislators and gets caught up 
in discussing the rules that govern decision-making.  See Dworkin id at 45-46.  When 
Dworkin first distinguishes principles from rules, he makes principles seem flexible.  
“[A principle] does not necessitate a particular decision.”  Id at 26.  Then, when 
Dworkin elaborates on his theory of how principles function in the law, the principles 
become rigid.  “[T]here is nothing in the logical character of a principle that renders it 
incapable of binding [a legal official].”  Id at 35.  Dworkin’s attempt to balance these 
two positions is unsatisfying, and he lands on the conclusion that the judge will weigh 
competing principles but then, if they are not of equal weight, “he must decide 
accordingly…” (emphasis added).  Id at 36.  Thus, if principles are weighed correctly, 
the result will dictate the judge’s decision.   
13 Richard Posner, What Do Judges Maximize?  (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 
3 SUPREME COURT ECONOMIC REVIEW 1, 12 (1993).   
14 See e.g. James M. Buchanan, What is Public Choice Theory? 32 IMPRIMIS No. 3 
(2003). 
15 Hart maintained that the positivist separation between law and morality allows 
positivists to be more critical of law and policy because positivists do not assume that 
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and it is, I think, a belief that anyone can have, not only positivists.  (It is the 
same thing to say that humility is a valuable character trait.)  Positivists have 
beliefs, and they are beliefs that strongly affect the thoughts and actions of 
their adherents. 
Positivists believe that it is important to define “law” clearly and 
distinguish between legal obligations and other types of obligations like 
moral obligations.  The unstated implication is that morality is a lower level 
obligation – less reliable and less consistent.  This understanding forms part 
of the positivist criticism of natural law.  It is because moral views are so 
variable that they cannot provide a good basis for law.  If a citizen can rebel 
against any law that he happens to find immoral, then there will be no law.  
“…[T]he natural tendency of such doctrine is to impel a man, by a force of 
conscience, to rise up in arms against any law whatever that he happens not 
like.”16  Law – understood as posited law – is something we can know and 
enforce.  Morality is vague and vacillating and, therefore, weak. 
Positivists also believe that people will not obey their own rules without 
some external force.  In this, the positivists take up an understanding of 
human nature going back to St. Augustine that people are born greedy and 
selfish rather than good and law-abiding.  Philosophers in this long tradition 
contrast the passions and natural inclinations of people with “law” and morals 
which are things external to people to be imposed on them.17  This explains, I 
think, the positivist concern with enforceability.  Without real enforcement 
mechanisms there will be no regularity of law.  If people or nations obey 
certain laws without being forced, then this must be explained by reference to 
some other deterministic factor such as self-interest.18  The idea of people or 
nations obeying laws because they want to obey or because they share 
common beliefs is completely foreign to positivist thinking. 
                                                                                                         
law is somehow inherently “right.”  This argument was raised in response to criticisms 
of positivism that came out of the experience of Nazi Germany.  See Hart, supra note 6.  
16 JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT (James H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart 
eds., 1988) (1776). 
17 This point is made clearly by Hobbes when he describes the state of nature as a kind of 
anarchy.  THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Michael Oakeshott ed., Collier 1962) (1651).  
Later writers in the capitalist tradition – apologists for luxury like Bernard Mandeville 
and David Hume – also thought of people as being by nature full of lawless passions.   
18 A recent theory of international law follows this exact logic.  To explain the apparent 
conformity of States with international rules despite the absence of enforcement 
mechanisms, the theorists posit four possibilities:  coincidence of interest, coordination, 
cooperation, and coercion.  All four are tactics in pursuit of self-interest.  See JACK L. 
GOLDSMITH, ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005). 
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Positivism presents obvious problems for the international system.  
There is no international sovereign government that can enforce international 
laws.  For positivists, if there is no enforcement by a government in a top-
down manner then there is no law.  This has been explained by positivists 
themselves, as for example when John Bolton says, “International law is not 
law; it is a series of political and moral arrangements that stand or fall on their 
own merits.”19  Such a belief as Bolton’s detracts from the credibility of 
international treaties and customs.  Mr. Bolton himself as a policymaker has 
come out against U.S. participation in the United Nations and U.S. adherence 
to treaties and customs that are against U.S. interests.20   
In this we see the dynamic aspect of positivist theory.  In posing the 
question, “Is international law really ‘law’?” positivists do not merely inquire 
into the current state of the international legal system but also prescribe an 
attitude that officials should bring to future policymaking, namely that, since 
international law might not be “law” and since other nations are not likely to 
treat it as such, the U.S. should feel free to break its international 
commitments to suit its own interests.  People’s beliefs are affected by the 
writings of scholars and prevailing opinion.  Thus, positivists are not reciting 
an already existing truth about international law; rather, they are creating a 
belief system and making their truths true.   
Oddly, international law has attempted to embrace the very philosophy 
that is killing it.  Authority in the positivist scheme flows from the sovereign 
as head of State.  Unfortunately there is no international sovereign, so we 
must look to individual State sovereigns to create international laws.  Under 
positivism, then, it has become necessary to show the consent of each State to 
every international rule.21  In point of fact, international law existed before 
this fiction of “State consent” was devised.  Originally, “sovereignty” meant 
the exclusive control by the State over its internal affairs and its relative 
                                           
19 John R. Bolton, Is There Really ‘Law’ in International Affairs?  10 TRANSNAT’L L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 48 (2000). 
20 See John R. Bolton, The Risks and the Weaknesses of the International Criminal Court 
from America’s Perspective, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 186.  Bolton says that “[t]he idea that 
nations and individuals can be bound through ‘international law” is “naïve” and “in 
many instances simply dangerous.”  Id at 192. 
21 See Jonathan I Charney & Gennady M. Danilenko, Consent and the Creation of 
International Law, in BEYOND CONFRONTATION:  INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE POST-
COLD WAR ERA 23 (Lori Fisler Damrosch, Gennady M. Danilenko & Rein Mullerson 
eds. 1995).  For an interesting account of the historical shift in focus from natural law to 
State consent, see William S. Dodge, The Story of the Paquete Habana:  Customary 
International Law as Part of Our Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW STORIES (Laura 
Dickinson et al. eds., 2007). 
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autonomy at the international level vis-à-vis other States.  If a State was 
thought to be free with respect to other States, it was not thought to be free 
with respect to greater principles.  The sovereign was bound by higher laws 
like that of Nature and God, whether the sovereign consented or no.22   It is 
hard to think that State consent is necessary for international law if 
international law existed before State consent became so important to 
international lawyers.  This is clearly the case of a philosophical perspective 
changing people’s attitudes about an existing legal practice and thereby 
changing the practice. 
As part of international law, international custom too has shifted from a 
law based on what is “natural” to a law based on the consent of the sovereign.  
The new view requires proof of States’ practice as evidence of those States’ 
consent.   It is consent by action.  Since custom is binding on all States in the 
world, one would expect that courts would want unanimous consent of all 
States.  This does not happen, however, in part because it is simply too much 
to ask a court to look at State practice from all States and in part because no 
one takes seriously the idea that unanimous consent is required.  In the end 
most States are bound by customs that they never practiced or “consented to.”  
Some scholars have responded to this criticism with the idea of tacit consent – 
that the States that said nothing during the formation of the custom expressed 
agreement by their silence.  This explanation is somewhat forced.  In the first 
place, if this explanation were to hold, then courts would be required to tally 
the number of silent consents.  This the courts do not do.  Second, there are 
States that cannot consent, evenly tacitly, because they are not in existence 
during the formation of the custom.  These States nonetheless are bound by 
the custom.  More to the point, it seems that if we really want consent, we 
should just ask for it.  Why not jettison customary law altogether and rely 
only on clear expressions of consent like treaties?  In fact, this is something 
that positivists have suggested that we do.23 
Unfortunately, similar problems arise in international treaty law.  At first 
glance, treaty law lends itself well to the positivist idea of an international 
system based on the consent of sovereign States.  In some ways, this explains 
the excitement over the increased use of treaties to express international rules.  
In reality, however, positivists are as critical of treaties as they are of 
international customs.  The problem again is with sovereignty and State 
consent.  A treaty may express State consent very clearly on the day it is 
                                           
22 J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 10 (H. Waldock, 6th ed. 1963). 
23 Jeremy Bentham himself felt that increasingly fine-meshed treaty agreements would 
resolve most international disputes.  See Anthony D’Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 4-8 (1983).   
 
348                                            MIZAN LAW REVIEW                             Vol. 3 No.2, September 2009 
 
 
    
signed.  What will happen over the long term though?  A treaty cannot 
provide for its own bindingness any more than a house can be built up on thin 
air.  A sovereign that by definition has the power to consent seemingly has 
the power to remove consent at any time.  A sovereign may agree to “bind its 
own hands” so-to-speak, but who will tie the bonds?  A sovereign that can tie 
the bonds can untie them as well.  A State that consents to a treaty today may 
remove its consent tomorrow and simply take the bad consequences.  When 
the treaties in question are agreements between equally powerful States, then 
the treaty is more secure because enforcement by use of force is realistically 
possible for both sides.  One wonders what the point of the treaty is, however, 
if force will accomplish the same thing as the treaty from moment to moment.  
In the past what made treaties binding was the generally-accepted belief that 
it is good to be trustworthy as a State much the same as it is good to be 
trustworthy as a person.  This is the international custom pacta sunt servanda 
– a kind of international pressure to keep one’s promises.  A State does not 
consent to keep its promises; a State is compelled to keep its promises. 
To understand why positivism is so unhelpful in international relations, 
one has to imagine what affect an alternate belief would have on the behavior 
of officials and, hence, States.  Let me give two examples.  In ancient times, 
superstitious leaders made pacts with foreign nations by swearing to the gods.  
The belief was that a violation of the pact then would bring down the forces 
of divine retribution.  The belief changed people’s behavior in that it made 
the parties more likely to keep the agreement.  A more complex example 
comes out of European history of the early modern period.  European leaders 
often floated in the same social circles, and certain behaviors in war were 
considered barbaric and ungentlemanly by those social circles.  Thus, an 
individual officer who pursued brutal tactics would lose his reputation in 
society.  The basic belief in “civilization” gave effect to standards of warfare, 
at least as concerned upperclassmen. 
Another area where positivism fails us is in legal reform projects in 
developing countries.  By the positivist logic, a central government needs to 
promulgate rules and invest in an extensive legal infrastructure to see to the 
enforcement of those rules.  The greater the infrastructure, the better the 
enforcement, the more successful the laws at regulating human behavior.  
There seems to be a misunderstanding out there that, because the largest and 
most complex legal machinery is found in developed countries, then that 
means that this legal machinery must be part of the advance of civilization 
from less to greater law-abidingness.24  This is to ignore certain basic facts, 
                                           
24 There are better explanations for why economically developed countries have greater 
legal infrastructure.  For example, economic development has negative effects on social 
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such as the lower crime rates in cities in certain developing nations where the 
legal infrastructure is rather weak.   
Some have claimed that legal reform will lead to economic development, 
as though in this area also behavioral changes can be accomplished best by 
top-down imposition of the law.25  Unfortunately, laws designed to promote 
economic development often are undermined by persistent social practices 
and mafia-like influence that continue in “free” markets.  In fact, great 
economic progress has been made in countries like China and Vietnam where 
legal infrastructure is weak.26  This would seem to argue against the positivist 
notion that law and order – or at least the law and order necessary for 
economic development – come from the application of force by the State. 
In certain developing countries, governments have spent years trying to 
enforce laws adopted from European countries.  Most such projects have 
failed.27  It is true that some countries like Japan and India have copied 
European laws with limited success, but it is hard to attribute this success to 
the process of drafting, adoption, and police enforcement that makes for 
posited law.   In Turkey, for example, western commercial law was imposed 
with little difficulty whereas western family law was resisted.28  One suspects 
that this difference was not because Turkish family law judges were 
singularly incompetent but rather because the Turkish people had a different 
attitude towards western family law than towards western commercial law.  
Transplanted laws usually fail because of the problem of “legal absorption.”29  
People choose not to obey the new laws.  That is, the laws are ignored in 
practice because most people believe in something else. 
Ethiopia gives us one example of the problems of transplanted law.  A 
legal reform project was begun in Ethiopia with the adoption of laws 
beginning in the 1950s modeled largely on the French code.  The principal 
drafter of the Ethiopian Civil Code, René David, took the position that 
                                                                                                         
order, and thus more legal infrastructure is necessary as the “functional complement of 
a weak posttraditional morality.”  Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms:  An 
Author’s Reflections, 76 DENV. U. L. R. 937, 938 (1999).  
25 See Richard Posner, Creating a Legal Framework for Economic Development, 13 THE 
WORLD BANK RESEARCH OBSERVER 1, 2 (1998).   
26 Id at 2. 
27 This is especially true of Westernization projects in sub-Saharan Africa.  See Ruth 
Gordon, Growing Constitutions, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 528, 542 (1999). 
28 See K. Lipstein, The Reception of Western Law in Countries of a Different Economic 
and Social Background with Special Regard to Problems Arising Out of 
Industrialization, 6 ANNALES DE LA FACULTÉ DE DROIT D’ISTANBUL 10 (1956). 
29 See Beverly I. Moran, Homogenized Law:  Can the United States Learn from African 
Mistakes?, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 361, 371 (2001). 
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whatever he wrote in the code was the law of Ethiopia.30  This is a distinctly 
positivist perspective.  Someone less influenced by positivist philosophy 
might have deferred more to the morals and customs of the people.  Instead, 
David looked forward to the slow and steady implementation of the code by 
the Ethiopian courts and police.  Ten years after the adoption of these new 
laws, a study found that they had made little impact.31  
It was understandably difficult for David to incorporate customary laws 
into the new code.  The customs of Ethiopia varied from region to region, and 
the task given to David was to make Ethiopian laws uniform.  In addition, 
very little was known or published about the different Ethiopian customs at 
the time.32  David himself had the modest expectation that the Code would be 
implemented gradually, starting with the major cities.33  The point is not that 
customs should have been incorporated wholesale into the positive law but 
rather that the positive law should have been less exclusively positive.  The 
positive law in Ethiopia could have given more discretion to local courts to 
apply local customs in particular situations.  Something similar has been done 
in the Uniform Commercial Code in the U.S. which allows courts to consider 
customs and practices in the particular industry concerned. 
The fact that the Ethiopian code has not been implemented successfully 
in Ethiopia now after fifty years should tell us something about the positivist 
ideas on which it is based.  What is surprising is that positivists – normally so 
critical – have not confronted such failures.  Rather, like other true believers, 
they make excuses for bad results and go on believing. 
 
                                           
30 See Norman J. Singer, The Early Days of the Faculty of Law, AAU, 2 MIZAN L.R. 137, 
144 (2008).   
31 See John H. Beckstrom, Transplantation of Legal Systems:  An Early Report on the 
Reception of Western Laws in Ethiopia, 21 AM. J. COMP. L. 557 (1973).  “[Empirical] 
evidence shows a country hardly aware of the new codes and a judiciary still struggling 
to comprehend them in basic particulars – even in the major urban areas.”  Id. at 582.  
Beckstrom himself was undaunted by his study and hinted that Ethiopia’s code would 
be successful eventually if given enough time.  Id.  It is clear, however, that, looking 
back from 2009, the Ethiopian code continues to have the same problems of legal 
absorption.  
32 Even the Ethiopian members of the Codification Commission did not know the 
customs of their own regions.  A summary of decisions by local bodies was put together 
for the use of the drafters of the code, but the summary was never translated from the 
Amharic.  See Norman J. Singer, Modernization of Law in Ethiopia:  A Study in 
Process and Personal Values, 11 HARV. INT’L L. J. 80, 85 n. 44 (1970).   
33 See René David, A Civil Code for Ethiopia:  Considerations on the Codification of the 
Civil Law in African Countries, 37 TULANE L. REV. 187, 202 (1963).   
